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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
theory were upheld the court would be in the curious position of having
abolished an estate which it considered objectionable and of having re-
placed it with an estate generally regarded as objectionable. For, if A
and B were joint tenants the conveyance by A to C would have converted
the joint tenancy into a tenancy in common, and C would be the owner
of an undivided one half interest. If A and B were tenants in common
with right of survivorship annexed, the deed from A to C would not
destroy B's right of survivorship whether this right is in the form of a
contingent remainder or of an executory interest.
Whether or not the grantees in a survivorship deed are husband and
wife, the important question is whether a court will impose upon the
grantees an indestructible right of survivorship in the form of a remainder
or executory interest when the deed does not dearly indicate an attempt
to do so. Such a restraint on alienation seems unjustifiable in view of
the fact that the desired result -the right of survivorship -could be
attained without this restraint, if the court would clarify the law by stat-
ing that joint tenancies or tenancies by the entirety are created when the
intent to create them is properly manifested.
G. VERNON OWEN, JR.
Simultaneous Deaths of Joint Owners
Upon death of one owner, property held jointly by two persons with
the right of survivorsip passes entirely to the survivor.' But what happens
when there is no survivor -where no evidence exists to show that the joint
holders died otherwise than simultaneously? 2 This contingency gives rise
to serious problems. Application of arbitrary rules of law may be necessary
to reach a solution.3
PRESUMPTIONS
When two or more persons died in a common disaster and there was no
evidence as to the order of death, the civil law employed certain presump-
1 The incident of survivorship is discussed in the immediately preceding note. Though
independent, the present note should be read in conjunction therewith.
'Most of these cases arise as a result of deaths in common disasters. Rare indeed
is the case where joint owners of property die simultaneously though apart from
each other. The same rules as applied to "common disaster" cases govern, however.
UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS DE.ATH Acr, 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 659-661
(1942) which will be examined snfra, applies to all cases of simultaneous death,
and is not limited to deaths resulting from common accidents. OHIo GEN. CODE
§ 10503-18 is similarly unlimited in its application.
'See the Commissioners' prefatory note to the UNIFORm SIMULTANEOUS DEATH
ACT, 9 UN IORM LAWS ANNOTATED 657, 658 (1942), which refers to the prob-
lem as "unresoluble."
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tions of survivorship based upon age and sex.4 The common law rule in
most states is that there is no presumption that either party survived, or that
all died simultaneously. Some foreign jurisdictions follow a third rule
that in the case of death in a common disaster, there is a presumption that
the deaths were simultaneous.6 Apparently none of the states in the United
States has adopted this view.7 In 1925 England abrogated the common
law principle by enacting a statute which creates a presumption of survivor-
ship based upon the seniority of the deceased persons." Under this statute,
the younger is presumed to have survived the elder. All other factors are
disregarded. Evidence of actual survivorship, however, is not excluded."
In cases where rights depend on survivorship, the result of the common
law rule that no presumption whatever exists is, in legal effect, the same as
a presumption in favor of simultaneous death. In either instance, the claim-
'See Carpenter v. Severin, 201 Iowa 969, 204 N.W. 448 (1925). 9 WIGMORE,
EVIDENcE § 2532 (3d ed. 1940). Notes, 18 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 138 (1942), 27
IOWA L. REV. 137 (1941), 19 MINN. L REv. 596 (1935), 43 A.L.R. 1348
(1925). See also, Chapman, Presumptions of Surzivorship, 62 U. OF PA. L REV.
585 (1914). See Wislizenus, SurvivaJ in Death by Common Disaster, 6 ST. Louis
L RE . 1 (1921) (argument in favor of Civil Law presumptions).
'Young Women's Christian Home v. French, 187 U.S. 401, 23 Sup. Ct. 184 (1902);
Matter of Burza, 151 Misc. 577, 272 N.Y.S. 248 (Surr. 1934); Carpenter v. Severin,
201 Iowa 969, 204 N.W. 448 (1925). The leading English case expressing this
view is Wing v. Angrave, 8 H.L Cas. 183, 11 Eng. Rep. 397 (1860). See 9 WIG-
MORE, EviDENcE § 2532, et seq. (3d ed. 1940). Notes, 27 IowA L. REv. 137
(1941), 19 MINN. L REv. 596 (1935), 11 IowA L. Rav. 93 (1925), 43 A.LR.
1348 (1925) (exhaustive annotation).
*Moslem India, Germany, Italy. See 13 FoRD. L. REv. 17, 19, notes 18-21 (1944).
"In Ohio, the rule that there was to be no presumption whatever in the case of
death in a common disaster, Ware v. Kinch, 35 Ohio C. Dec. 547, (1919), was
apparently changed by a statement of the court in In re Francis, 15 Ohio Supp. 20,
21 [60 N.E. Reporter 2d] (P.C. 1940). "It being impossible to determine that
either Helen V. Francis or Charles Francis survived the other, the presumption must
be that their deaths were simultaneous and that neither one survived the other."
OHIO GEN. CODE § 10503-18 now governs. The section does not establish a pre-
sumption as to the order of death. It merely defines the right to property of those
who die within the time and under the circumstances therein described. Ostrander
v. Preece, 129 Ohio St. 625, 196 N.E. 670, appeal dismissed, 296 U.S. 543, 56 Sup.
Ct. 151 (1935).
a.Aw OF PROPERTY ACT, 1925 § 184. The Irish law remained unaffected by the
1925 Act. See Notes on Commorientes, 78 IR. L. T. 269 (1944).
' The Act provides that where the order of death is shown to be uncertain "... such
deaths shall subject to any order of the court... be presumed to have occurred in
order of seniority.. ." (italics supplied). It would seem that the italicized words
serve to provide flexibility to the Act by vesting an amount of discretion in the
court. But in the case of In re Lindop, [1942] Ch. 377, the statute was not so con-
strued. See 86 SOL. J. 263 (1942). The effect of the decision-that the court
could act only when enough evidence existed to displace the statutory presumption
-deprives the statute of elasticity which might prove helpful. This might lead to
ridiculous consequences. Thus, the court would have no discretion where a week-
old baby and a man in his physical prime are drowned in a shipwreck; the baby
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ant asserting tide through survivorship of one of the parties has the burden
of proving survivorship."° If he is unable to do this his claim fails.'1
The lack of any presumption of survivorship works in devolution by
descent in the following manner: where it is impossible to determine the
order of death of two persons, one of whom would normally inherit from
the other, the property of each descends as though the other had never
existed."2 This is based on the theory that the property of one person
cannot vest in another when vesting is dependent on survivorship, and
survivorship cannot be proved. 3 The same result would obtain if the
property were to pass by will.
14
would be presumed to have survived. Neither does the statute solve the problem of
simultaneous death of twins where it cannot be proved which is the elder. In such
a case it would seem the court would have to hold that they died simultaneously.
"In re Cruson's Estate, 221 P. 2d 892 (Ore. 1950); In re Evans' Estate, 228 Iowa
908, 291 N.W. 460 (1940); Carpenter v. Severin, 201 Iowa 969, 204 N.W. 448,
(1925). See Note, 18 NOTRE DAME LAW. 138, at 139 (1942). 9 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2532 (3d ed. 1940).
'In re Evans' Estate, 228 Iowa 908, 291 N.W. 460 (1940); McKinney v. Depoy,
213 Ind. 361, 12 N.E. 2d 250 (1938); Carpenter v. Severin, 201 Iowa 969, 204
N.W. 448 (1925).
'In re Sweeney's Estate, 78 Pa. Super. Ct. 417 (1922); Johnson v. Merithew, 80
Me. 111, 13 Ad. 132 (1888) (father and his children perished in a shipwreck);
Russell v. Hallet, 23 Kan. 194 (1880) (husband, wife, and children died in com-
mon disaster; property of husband, who died intestate passed to his heirs to the
exclusion of those of his wife and children). Note, 18 NOTRE DAME LAW. 138,
139 (1942). OHIO GEN. CODE § 10503-18; UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS DEATH
AcT, 9 U.L.A. 659 (1942).
'In re Evans' Estate, 228 Iowa 908, 291 N.W. 460 (1940); In re Sweeney's Estate,
78 Pa. Super. Ct. 417 (1922) (property of a co-deceased father never vested in his
deceased daughter, nor hers in him); McComas v. Wiley, 134 Md. 572, 108 Ad.
196 (1919) (parties involved were husband and wife).
" Carpenter v. Severin, 201 Iowa 969, 204 N.W.448 (1925) (held, since there
was no presumption of survivorship in a common disaster, the burden of proof was
on the party alleging survivorship). In the Carpenter case, the court refused to al-
low the heirs of the devisee to take under a statute which provided for distribution
of the property to the devisee's heirs when a devise lapsed, saying the statute was
inapplicable in simultaneous death cases. Bat cf. Harrison v. Hillegas, 1 Ohio Supp.
160 [30 N.E. Reporter 2d] (P.C. 1939), and Matter of Macklin, 177 Misc. 432,
30 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Surr. 1941), where under statutes similar to the Iowa statute,
the children of the devisee were allowed to take the devise. The cases can be dis-
tinguished by the fact that the Ohio and New York statutes made provisions for
lapsed legacies only when the devise was to a relative of the testator, and more dearly
favored the blood heirs of the devisee. OHIO GEN. CODE § 10504-73; N.Y. DECE-
DENT ESTATE LAW § 29.
Where the testator has the foresight to provide expressly in his will that in the
event he and his devisee die simultaneously the property is to be distributed in a
certain manner, his intent will be followed, and his property distributed according-
ly. Matter of Cashin, 182 Misc. 1, 46 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Surr. 1944) (property to
go to others); Matter of Fowles, 222 N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611 (1918) (property
to pass as though testator predeceased devisees, thus preventing a lapse). Glover v.
Reynolds, 135 N.J. Eq. 113, 37 A.2d 90 (1944) (will making provision for simul-
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Section 10503-18 of the Ohio General Code provides:
When there is no evidence of the order in which the death of two or
more persons occurred, no one of such persons shall be presumed to have
died first, and the estate of each shall pass and descend as though he had
survived the other or others. When the surviving spouse or other heir at
law or legatee dies within three days after the date of the decedent, or
within thirty days ... if such death resulted from a common accident, the
estate of such first decedent shall pass and descend as though he had sur-
vived such heir at law or legatee ....
The purpose and effect of this statute is to give the property of each dece-
dent to his own heirs or legatees15 - the same basic result reached by the
common law rule.
It will be noted that Section 10503-18 extends its provisions to in-
stances where survivorship of one of the parties is actually known. In this
respect; it changes the common law. Thus, if a husband and wife die as
many as thirty days apart as the result of a common accident, or three days
apart from independent causes, they do not inherit any property from each
other. The property of each passes to his or her own estate as though the
other did not exist.18  This provision is unique among the states.17  In
Ostrander v. Preece,"s the Ohio Supreme Court while intimating that such
a provision would be unconstitutional as a presumption, held it valid as
a statute governing descent and distribution. The statute wisely recognizes
that since the right to dispose of property is an important element in the
ownership thereof, any interval of time which is so brief as to preclude
the exercise of this privilege should be excluded in determining survivor-
ship.'" The statute also prevents double inheritance"0 and therefore double
taxation.
taneous death inoperative where husband in fact predeceased testator; legacy lapsed,
and property passed intestate).
'In re Estate of Metzger, 140 Ohio St. 50, 42 N.E.2d 443 (1942); In re Estate
of Kessler, 85 Ohio App. 240, 85 N.E.2d 609 (1949). See explanatory note in 4
Ohio Bar 227 (1931). It is to be noted that the statute does not create a presump-
tion of prior death. See note 6, supra.
"Harrison v. Hillegas, I Ohio Supp. 160 [30 N.E. Reporter 2d] (P.C. 1939).
The second decedent is prevented from inheriting any property of the first decedent.
In re Estate of Metzger, 140 Ohio St. 50,42 N.E.2d 443(1942). This was not the
result reached before the enactment of Section 10503-18. See Evans v. Halterman,
31 Ohio App. 175, 165 N.E. 869 (1928), where husband and wife were murdered
at about the same time. Evidence existed to show that the wife survived the husband
for a few moments, and the property was distributed accordingly.
'See Mater of Cashin, 182 Misc. 1, 46 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Surr. 1944), in which two
sisters in similar wills provided for occurrence of death under conditions very simi-
lar to those in Ohio General Code Section 10503-18. One sister died five and one-
half hours later than the other. Held; the "simultaneous death" provisions of the
wills governed in the distribution of the property of both. For a compilation of
similar cases, see Note, 173 A.L.R. 1254 (1948).
"129 Ohio St. 625, 196 N.E. 670, appeal dismissed, 296 U.S. 543, 56 Sup. Ct. 151
(1935).
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Section 1 of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act,21 adopted by thirty-
five states22 and two territories,28 provides for substantially the same scheme
of distribution24 as the Ohio act. It applies solely, however, in situations
where there is no evidence as to the order of death.25 Neither Section 10503-
18 of the Ohio General Code nor Section 1 of the Uniform Simultaneous
Death Act apply in cases of joindy-owned property where the instrument
creating the joint ownership creates therewith the right of survivorship.
The rights of the survivor arise solely out of the original instrument which
vest those rights in him; they are not affected by any law dealing with the
inheritance or descent of property.26 The solution of the problem created
by the simultaneous death of the joint owners must be found elsewhere.
"For a favorable discussion of the Ohio statute, see Legis., 50 HARv. L REV. 344,
348-349 (1936).
" In re Estate of Kessler, 85 Ohio App. 240, 85 N.E.2d 609 (1949). See Note, in
4 Ohio Bar 227 (1931).
219 U.LA. 659-661 (1942).
The only states which have not yet adopted it are Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and West Vir-
ginia.
Alaska and Hawaii. The District of Columbia has not adopted it, nor have any of
the United States possessions.
"§ 1: Where the title to property or the devolution thereof depends upon priority
of death and there is no sufficient evidence that the persons have died otherwise than
simultaneously, the property of each person shall be disposed of as if he had survived
except as provided otherwise in this act.
9 U.L.A. 659 (1942). Several states have introduced variations in this section
of the Uniform Act. Nevada adds an additional section relating to the distribution
of community property where husband and wife die simultaneously, which is similar
to the provisions of the above section. NEv. COMP. LAWs § 9885.05 (1949 Supp.).
After the words "... and there is no sufficient evidence that the persons have died
otherwise than simultaneously . . ." Missouri adds: "as determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction." Mo. R.S.A. § 317.1 (1950 Supp.). The theory of the
Act is that as to the property of each person he is presumed to be the survivor.
Commissioners' prefatory note to the UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT, 9
U.L.A. 657-658 (1942).
'The Uniform Simultaneous Death Act was not intended to change the degree of
proof necessary to maintain survivorship. Commissioners' prefatory note to the
UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS DEATH Acr, 9 U.LA. 657-658 (1942). For the
amount of evidence needed to prove survivorship in general, see John E. Tracy and
John J. Adams, Evidence of Survivorship in Common Disaster Cases, 38 MICH. L.
REV. 801 (1940).
'In re Kessler, 85 Ohio App. 240, 85 N.E.2d 609 (1949) (interest of wife in joint
and survivorship bank account passed to the surviving husband immediately upon
her death, by virtue of the contract of deposit. Section 10503-18 of the Ohio Gen-
eral Code had no application); Staunton v. P. L. & A. Insurance Co., 69 Ohio App.
27, 42 N.E. 2d 687 (1941) (rights between insured and beneficiaries arise solely
out of insurance contracts; inheritance statutes inapplicable). So in the case of sur-
vivorship deeds any rights that the parties have arise out of the provisions of the
deed and are in no way affected by General Code section 10503-18. Ross v. Bow-
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DISTRIBuTIoN
1. Property held in joint tenancy or tenancy -y the entirety
Where no evidence exists to show that one of the tenants in a joint
tenancy or tenancy by the entirety survived the other, and no presumption as
to survivorship is employed,C2 how is the property to be distributed? In
Bradshaw v. Toulmin,2s Lord Thurlow expressed the opinion that if joint
tenants perish by one blow, the jointly held estate will remain in their respec-
tive heirs as joint tenants. Prior to the introduction of the Uniform Simul-
taneous Death Act, the view in the United States was that where joint
tenants or tenants by the entirety perish in a common disaster, the property
so held passes as though the owners were tenants in common,29 an equal
portion passing to the heirs of each. Two exceptions to this rule should be
noted: a) When one of the tenants has contributed more toward the tenancy
than the other, there is authority for the view that the heirs of such tenant
should succeed to the proportion which that tenant has contributed.30
b) Where one of the tenants murders the other, some jurisdictions deprive
man, 32 Ohio Op. 27 (P.C. 1945). See Charles C. White, Notes on Survivorship
Deeds- So-Called, 24 Ohio Op. 119 (1942).
Under the wording of such a section, passing the property of each as though he
had survived the other, the heirs of both owners would be entitled to the entire
property. This is an impossibility. One parcel of land cannot pass exclusively to
two sets of claimants. It is inconsistent to say that property designated to pass en-
tirely to the one owner surviving, shall pass as though both survived.
'If such a presumption were employed, the representatives of the surviving tenant
would be entitled to the entire amount of the property.
'2 Dick. 635, 21 Eng. Rep. 417 (1784). The oldest case involving simultaneous
death of joint tenants was Broughton v. Randall, Cro. Eliz. 502, 78 Eng. Rep. 752
(1596) [Noy 64, 74 Eng. Rep. 1032 (1596)]. Although the two reports of the
case differ as to which of the joint tenants - father or son - lived longer, both agree
on the determining fact in the case: that one victim moved his feet or shook his legs
after the other was dead.
The leading American case is McGhee v. Henry, 144 Tenn. 548, 234 S.W. 509
(1921). See also, Vaughan v. Borland, 234 Ala. 414, 175 So. 367 (1937) (per-
sonal property). Although a tenancy by the entirety was involved in the McGhee
case, the same rule was adopted in respect to joint tenancies in Bierbrauer v. Moran,
244 App. Div. 87, 279 N.Y.S. 176 (1935), which cited the McGhee case as the
authority on the subject. See Note, 18 A.L.R. 103 (1921). Note, 18 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 138 (1942).
'This rule was adopted in In re Strong's Will, 171 Misc. 445, 12 N.Y.S.2d 544
(Surr. 1939), noted in 25 CORNELL L Q. 316 (1940), 53 HARv. L. REV. 338
(1939), which involved the simultaneous deaths of husband and wife, tenants by
the entirety, and in which it was held that since the tenancy had been created wholly
out of the husband's means, the property passed as though it had been owned by
him alone before the simultaneous death.
Prior to the 1925 Law of Property Act, notes 8, 9, supra, it had appeared to be
the English rule that although the joint owners held the legal title in equal shares,
there was a resulting trust to the heirs of each in proportion to his contribution.
Lake v. Gibson, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 291, 21 Eng. Rep. 1052 (1729); Rigdon v. Vallier,
3 Atk. 731, 26 Eng. Rep. 1219 (1751). Today, the younger would be presumed
1951]
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the murderer or his heirs of all the property, despite the fact that the mur-
derer is the survivor."' Some courts, however, recognize that title passes to
the murderer, but enforce a trust on the property in favor of the victim's
heirs.3 2 In respect to tenancies by the entirety at least, some jurisdictions
allow the murderer to keep the property, on the ground that he was already
possessed of a vested interest in the entirety of the property before the mur-
der,33 and that to deprive him of the property would be contrary to prohibi-
tions against forfeiture of estate.3
to have survived, and the entire property would be distributed to his heirs. An
equitable contribution, however, might result where the deceased joint owners were
of exactly the same age - a highly remote possibility.
"Bierbrauer v. Moran, 244 App. Div. 87, 279 N.Y.S. 176 (1935) (presumption
employed that murderer predeceased victim, although murderer committed suicide
in another room, and there existed no proof as to survivorship). Matter of Sparks,
172 Misc. 642, 15 N.Y.S. 2d 926 (Surr. 1939) (plaintiff, in prison ten years for
murder of his wife, presumed not to have survived her).
For disposition of property when a joint tenant or tenant by the entirety murders
the other tenant, see Notes, 82 U. of PA. L. REv. 183 (1933), 44 Htmv. L REv.
125 (1930), 51 A.L.R. 1106 (1927).
The problems arising when an heir murders his intestate are discussed in Notes,
51 A.L.R. 1096 (1927), 156 A.L.R. 623 (1945). As to the right of a murderer
to take as beneficiary under the will of his victim, see Notes, 51 A.L.R. 1113
(1927), 1 OHiO ST. L J. 131, 135 (1935).
'Sherman v. Weber, 113 N.J. Eq. 451, 167 Ad. 517 (1933); Bryant v. Bryant,
193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188
(1889). This result is on the public policy ground that a murderer shall not be
allowed to profit by his own crime. See Notes, 82 U. of PA. L. REV. 183 (1933),
44 HARv. L. REV. 125 (1930), 5 N. C. L. REV. 373 (1927), 30 HARV. L. REV.
622 (1917), 51 A.L.R. 1106 (1927).
'Wenker v. Landon, 161 Ore. 265, 88 P.2d 971 (1939); Beddingfield v. Estill &
Newman, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108 (1906). The Wenker case, following the
reasoning used and the result reached in the Beddingfield case, based its decision on
the peculiar nature of a tenancy by the entirety. Due to the common law fictional
unity of husband and wife, there are no moieties in such an estate, and each owner
holds the entirety by virtue of the original conveyance creating the tenancy. Statutes
providing that a murderer shall not inherit any property from his victim are inap-
plicable since the murderer inherited nothing from the spouse's estate by his or her
death, and the statutes do not operate to deprive persons of property vested in them
before the murder. Ibid. Cf. Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E. 838
(1935), noted in 1 OHIO ST. L J. 131 (1935), 4 FoRD. L. REV. 510 (1935)
(property right to entirety of joint and survivorship bank account vested in mur-
derer by contract of deposit; nothing new acquired by murder since prior to victim's
death, murderer had right to withdraw entire funds had he so desired). In a recent
case, Welsh v. James, 95 N.E.2d 872 (Ill. 1950), property held in joint tenancy
was allowed to pass entirely to the surviving tenant, who allegedly murdered the
other tenant. The court refused to impose a constructive trust in favor of the vic-
tim's heirs. To do so would unconstitutionally deprive him of property vested in
him "... by the instrument creating the joint tenancy long before [the victim's]
death." Id., at 875.
"4Beddingfield v. Estill, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108 (1908) (tenancy by the
entirety): Acc: Wenker v. Landon, 161 Ore. 265, 88 p. 2d 971 (1939) (tenancy
by the entirety).
[Ju-e
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Section 3 of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act provides that when
there is no evidence of survivorship, property held in joint tenancy or ten-
ancy by the entirety shall be distributed ".. .one-half as if one [tenant] had
survived and one-half as if the other had survived."35 If there are more
than two such tenants, the property is to be distributed equally in propor-
tion to the number of tenants.3 6 This provision represents a codification
of the prevailing common law view.3 7 Although the dear language of the
Act would seem to rule out any disposition of such property according to
the proportions of the contribution of each tenant,3 s Section 3 is silent as to
the situations where one tenant murders the other and survivorship cannot
be proved. Thus, a court is not precluded from refusing to distribute the
property to the heirs of the murderer on the basis of public policy.
Property held in joint tenancy or in tenancy by the entirety passes as
though the joint owners were tenants in common, regardless of whether
the particular jurisdiction has adopted the Uniform Simultaneous Death
Act. But in the case of property held in concurrent ownership where no
joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety is created, the solution is not so
plain. It is necessary, therefore, to examine at least two remaining types of
survivorship instruments, and the dispositions to be made thereunder in
the event of simultaneous death of the co-owners: instruments which create
in the joint owners a tenancy in common of the fee subject to executory
limitations; and instruments creating joint life estates with cross contingent
remainders.39
2. Teiancy in common in fee subject to executory limiaions
The general rule in the United States is that if an executory limitation
fails to take effect, the preceding estate will continue in the first taker or
takers, according to his or their original limitation, unless a contrary inten-
"9 U.L.A. 660 (1942).
"Ibir. California omits "or tenants by the entirety" from the section, DERYNG's
PROBE. CODE § 296.4 (1949), and adds a section providing that in the case of com-
munity property, one-half is to be distributed as if the husband had survived and
one-half as if the wife had survived. DEERiNG'S PROBE. CODE § 296.4 (1949).
Connecticut, Nebraska, and Washington also omit reference to tenants by the entirety.
CoNN. STAT. REv. 1949 § 7070; NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-123 (1948); WASH. L
1943, c. 113, § 3. Nevada retains the "tenancy by the entirety" provision of the
Uniform Act, Nrv. COMP. LAws § 9885.03 (1949 Supp.), and adds an additional
section dealing with community property. NEV. COMP. LAWS § 9889.05 (1949
Supp.). Missouri requires that a "court of competent jurisdiction" determine that
the parties did not die otherwise than simultaneously. Mo. R_ S. A. § 317.3 1950
Supp.).
'See note 29, supra.
"Thus even New York has abandoned the contribution theory by the enactment of
N. Y. DEcEDENT ESTATE LAw § 89. The equitability of the Uniform Act's pro-
visions has been questioned by some authors. See Conway and Bertsche, The New
York Simultaneous Death Law, 13 FoRD. L REv. 17, at 28 (1944).
19511
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tion on the part of the grantor or testator appears.40 If the preceding estate
was one in fee simple, subject only to the executory limitation, failure of
the limitation makes the preceding estate absolute.41 Thus where A and B
have a tenancy in common in fee, subject to the executory limitation that
the fee is to pass to the survivor upon the death of either, upon destruction
of that limitation -by reason of the simultaneous death of A and B-
the interest of both A and B should become absolute in their heirs, passing
as though they were tenants in common of the fee subject to no executory
limitations.42
3. Joint life estates with contingent remainders
Where a life estate is followed by a contingent remainder, a reversion
remains in the transferor.43 If the contingency occurs and the remainder
vests, the fee passes to the remainderman, and the reversion is destroyeL 44
Upon failure of the contingency the owner of the reversion is entitled to
possession 45 If survivorship instruments create joint life estates with
contingent remainders in the life tenants, the above principles should
For examples of the language needed to create such interests, see Note, 3 WEsTERN
RESERvE L. Ruv. 60 (1951).
"Farnam v. Farnam, 83 Conn. 369, 77 Atl. 70 (1910); Saxton v. Webber, 83
Wis. 617, 53 N.W. 905 (1892). 2 TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 386, p.
147 (3d ed. 1939). 3 SIMEs, FUTURE INTEREsTs §§ 770-771 (1936). RESTATE-
MENT, PROPERTY §§ 228, 229 (1936). This rule is also followed in English cases
where the executory limitation fails under the rule against perpetuities. Jackson
v. Noble, 2 Keen. 590, 48 Eng. Rep. 755 (1838). But if the executory limitation
fails for other reasons, the English rule is that the preceding estate will be divested
unless there is some evidence of the conveyor's intent to the contrary. Doe d. Blom-
field v. Eyre, 5 C. B. 713, 136 Eng. Rep. 1058 (1848). 3 SiMEs, FTURE INTER-
EsTs § 769 (1936).
'3 SIMEs, FtTURE INTERESTs § 767 (1936). See RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§
228, 229 (1936).
'This result is in accord with the American rule. See note 40, supra. A and B's
tenancies in common were limited only by the condition that if either one survived
the other, he was to take over his interest. Since neither survived, the limitation was
destroyed by the simultaneous death of A and B. If the grantor or testator were to
manifest his intent that the property was to vest elsewhere in the event the executory
limitation were to fail, his intention would be followed. See note 65, infra.
" Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Harloff, 133 N.J. Eq. 44, 30 A.2d 57 (1943);
Pinckney v. Weaver, 216 Ill. 185, 74 N.E. 714 (1905); Gilpin v. Williams, 25
Ohio St. 283 (1874). 2 TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 311a (3d ed.
1939).. 2 BL. COMM. *175.
It will be assumed, for the purposes of the present note, that the transferor has
not transferred this interest.
" 3 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS § 774 (1936). The reversion in such case arises
by operation of law. It is simply that portion of the estate remaining undisposed of.
Id, at 68. 2 TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 311a (3d. ed. 1939). 2 BL.
COMM. * 175.
' Fuller v. Black, 298 Ill. 351, 131 N.E. 641 (1921). 2 TIFFANY, L&w OF REAL
PROPERTY § 332 (3d ed. 1939).
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apply. Failure of the contingencies by virtue of simultaneous death should
result in reversion of full title to the transferor. 6 The result might not be
particularly inequitable in the case where the land was a gift, as in the
case of a gratuitous conveyance, or a devise to the co-holders. However, the
same cannot be said for the ordinary commercial transaction, where con-
sideration is given for the property by one or more of the joint transferees.
But what is to be done with the fee, and upon what basis? a. The land
may descend as though the life tenants were tenants in common of the
fee, an equal portion to the heirs of each. b. The fee may revert to the
transferor or his heirs to hold in trust for the heirs of the deceased life
tenants.
a. Although there are as yet no cases on the matter, it is submitted that
the former should be the result reached in the states which have adopted
the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act. Section 9 of the Act provides that
all laws or parts of laws inconsistent with the Uniform Act are repealed.
If the Act is applicable, the manner of disposition of property provided'
thereby supersedes the general rules of property reaching an inconsistent
result.47  The problem is one of construction-i.e., whether the Act is
applicable in the case of an instrument creating life interests with cross re-
mainders contingent upon survivorship.
Section 2 of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act provides:
Where two or more beneficiaries are designated to take successively by
reason of survivorship under another person's disposition of property and
there is no sufficient evidence that these beneficiaries have died otherwise
than simultaneously the property thus disposed of shall be divided into as
many portions as there are successive beneficiaries and these portions shall
be distributed respectively to those who would have taken in the event that
each designated beneficiary had survived.
The significance of the words "successively" and "successive" is not dear.
It is uncertain whether this section is intended to apply in the case of si-
multaneous death of two or more "beneficiaries" who are designated to
take alternatively by reason of survivorship - as is the case with survivor-
ship deed grantees. Several writers 8 maintain that this is the intention.
Five states, in their versions of the Act, have specifically added the words
"or alternatively" and "or alternate" to Section 2 following the words "suc-
cessively" and "successive," thereby seemingly bringing the holders of land
' See note 44, rupra. The reversioner is then entitled to immediate possession un-
less there is an alternate remainder to another. 2 TFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§§ 332, 333 (3d ed. 1939).
"But this section of the Uniform Act is omitted by Connecticut, Florida, Kansas,
Missouri, Nebraska, and North Dakota. Query, would these states employ the
method of disposition set forth by the Act, if applicable?
" Conway and Bertsche, The New York Smuranleaous Death Law, 13 FoRD. L REv.
17, at 34, 35 (1944); note, 13 Mo. L. REv. 230, at 232 (1948).
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under survivorship instruments within the provisions of the Act. 9 Even
without this modification the same result might be reached by a reasonable
construction of Section 2. It might be argued that since the term "bene-
ficiaries" is used in the section, its application is limited to trusts and testa-
mentary devises. But the section makes no distinction between paying and
non-paying transferees. For the purposes of the Uniform Act, payment of
consideration is immaterial. By virtue of Section 2 and Section 9, the possi-
bility of a reversion of the property is eliminated.
In a jurisdiction where the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act is not in
effect, it would be difficult to circumvent the rule that a reversion results
in the event of simultaneous death of the life tenants. Authors who have
recognized the problem are divided in opinion.50 Desirable as it might be,
a rule passing the fee equally to the heirs of the life tenants would necessarily
be an arbitrary one, based on equitable considerations and the probable
intent of the parties, rather than general rules of property law.51
b. A second possibility would permit a reversion to the transferor or his
heirs, but require the property to be held in trust for the heirs of the deceased
life tenants. This would have the advantage of satisfying both the legal
and equitable demands of the situation. It has been suggested that a trust
should result in favor of the payor of the consideration, who might be
only one of the life tenants. 52 However, the resulting trust theory may not
"Kansas, Massachusetts, New York, Washington, and Wisconsin. KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. 58-702 (1949); ANNOT. LAws MAss. c. 190A. § 2 (1949 Supp.);
N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 89 subd. 2 (1949) (eliminates the words "succes-
sive" and "successively" altogether); WASH. LAWs 1943, c. 113 § 2; Wis. LAws,
1943, c. 113 § 2.
'In a Note in 24 Ohio Op. 119 (1942), Charles C. White expresses the attitude
that in a so-called survivorship deed the whole title passes to the grantees "without
any strings attached thereto . . ." and indicates that it is his "hunch" that the court
"would take the bull by the horns and divide the property equally among the heirs
of the victims of the common accident." Id, at 120. Professor Arthur T. Martin,
however, in The Incident of Survivorship in Ohio, 3 OHIO ST. L. J. 48, at 64
(1936), insists that in such a situation the remainders are not vested but contingent.
The transferor, therefore, would retain a reversionary interest. See GRAY, RULE
AGAINST PERPETITiES § 9 (4th ed. 1942).
If the transfer of the property were supported by consideration the fee would
revert to the transferor in the event of simultaneous death of the co-tenants, but only
to be held in trust for the prayor of the consideration. Olds, Tenancy for Life or in
Fee? 18 OKLA. B. J. 60, at 62 (1947).
In one writer's opinion, "... prior to the Uniform Act, if A and B were killed
... [simultaneously] ... it would appear that claimants under neither could succeed
to the property, and it would revert to the grantor . .." Note, 13 Mo. L. Rav. 230
(1948).51See notes 54, 60, infra.
5For this view see Olds, Tenancy for Life or in Fee?, 18 OKLA. B. J. 60 (1947).
Mr. Olds leads the reader to believe that section 423 of ScoTT, TRUsTs (pp. 2205-
2206) stands for this proposition. This section, however, deals with resulting trusts
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be applicable in the case of simultaneous death of survivorship deed
grantees.53  It would seem that the theory of a constructive trust is a
sounder basis for the imposition of a trust. Equity will enforce a trust even
where there is none intended in the case of mistake leading to unjust en-
richment of one of the parties.4 'This is true even where the acquisition of
the property is not wrongful. 5  Such a trust has been imposed where,
without the knowledge of either party, a deed covered more land than was
intended. 5 The same reasoning should apply where there is a conveyance
of a smaller interest than was intended by all the parties, through over-
sight in failing to provide for the contingency of simultaneous death of the
life tenants. The transferor assumes he is parting with full title. He re-
ceives full consideration for the property. It would therefore be uncon-
scionable for him or his heirs to retain legal tide should it revert to them.
To prevent unjust enrichment which would otherwise result, courts of
equity should declare the transferor or his heirs trustees of the fee, in favor
of the heirs of the deceased transferees.
Even in the cases of a gift of the land, the problem of the intent of the
grantor or testator must be considered. There may be cogent moral argu-
ments for allowing the heirs of the deceased life tenants to take the property.
It is highly unlikely that at the time of the transfer, the parties believed
that any interest whatever remained in the transferor. As far as all were
concerned, no conditions were attached to the conveyance or devise.57 How-
ever, in the case of a gratuitous transfer, it is impossible to avoid the fact
that the transferor actually did not part with the entire fee, and that no
equitable reason exists for him to do so. It might well be held that only
in event that the transferor parts with the reversion by providing for
the contingency of simultaneous death could the heirs of the deceased co-
owners take.
arising from failure of express trusts. No express trusts are involved in most sur-
vivorship instrument cases.
'As a general proposition, when one pays the purchase price for the conveyance of
property to another, a trust results in favor of the payor of the consideration. 2
BOGLHRT, TRuSTS AND TRusTEEs §§ 454-463 (1935). 3 ScoTr, TRUSTS § 440
(1939). See RESTATEmENT, REstON, §§ 163-164 (1936). But here, the
payors of the consideration - the co-grantees - have in fact received the property.
The problem is to prevent the transferor from being unjustly enriched by re-acquisi-
tion of the land.
"In re Berry, 147 F. 208 (2d Cir. 1906). 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §
474 (1935). In a constructive trust, it is not the intent of the parties as manifested
by the words used which governs, but the equitable obligations arising from the re-
lations of the parties. Motley's Adm'r. v. Tabor, 208 Ky. 702, 271 S.W. 1064
(1925).
S3 ScoTr, TRUSTS § 462.2 (1939).
"Walker v. Herzfeld, 223 Ala. 310, 135 So. 453 (1931).
"See White, Notes on Survivorship Deeds-So-Called, 24 Ohio Op. 119 (1942).
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4. Express provision covering simultaneous death- transfers by co-
Owners
In the event that the parties foresee the possibility of simultaneous death
and provide for a different disposition of the property should such con-
tingency occur, the intent as manifested will govern, and the property will
be so distributed.5 8 Section 6 of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act con-
tributes toward this flexibility by allowing the parties to make a different
disposition of the property in any will, deed, trust, or contract of insurance.09
Where the instrument creates joint life estates in A and B, with cross con-
tingent remainders, the transferor has several alternatives to avoid the un-
certainty regarding a reversionary interest. He may provide that in the
event that there is insufficient evidence to show whether A or B survived,
the property a. shall pass to a third person; b. shall be distributed equally
among the heir's and representatives of A and B; or c. shall revert to the
transferor.
a. Where the form of the instrument is "... to A and B for life, re-
mainder to the survivor, his or her heirs and assigns, but if there is insuffi-
cient evidence to show whether A or B survived, remainder to C, his heirs
and assigns.. ." C has an alternate contingent remainder, to take effect if
the contingent remainders in A and B should fail. The transferor's rever-
sion is a technical one only.81
At common law a contingent remainder could be destroyed by for-
feiture of the life estate upon which it was based, resulting from a tortious
conveyance by the life tenant of a greater interest than he possessed. 6 2 A
'Dickey v. Citizens' State Bank of Fairmont, 98 Ind. App. 58, 180 N.E. 36 (1932)
(transferor's power to give includes power to attach any conditions satisfactory to
him and not contrary to law).
'99 U.L.A. 660 (1942).
' At the time of the transfer, there must be a reversion in the transferor if all the
remainders are contingent. A reversionary interest exists where the transferor has
failed to dispose of his estate fully. It is the undisposed of residue. 2 BL. COMM.
*175. 2 TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 311a, p. 4 (3d ed. 1939). As de-
fined in RESTATEMmN, PROPERTY § 154 (1936), a reversionary interest is any
future interest left in a transferor or his successor in interest. In the example cited,
since C's remainder is contingent, a technical reversion remains in the transferor.
But because of the language of the instrument, the transferor wil never enjoy the
right to possession of the land.
n2 TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 333 (3d ed. 1939). Cs interest is what
is sometimes referred to as a remainder on a contingency with a triple aspect. Ibid.
See, e.g., Sumner v. Westcott, 86 Conn. 217, 84 At. 921 (1912).
'Thus if A and B attempted to convey a fee simple estate by feoffment, fine, or
recovery, the life estates of A and B were destroyed. All contingent remainders de-
pendent upon the life estates of A and B, including C's remainder, also were de-
stroyed. The person having the next vested estate (here the reversioner) had a
right of entry which could be exercised immediately. 1 SnmS, FUTURE INTEREsTs
§ 100 (1936). 2 TIFFANY, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY § 328 (3d ed. 1939). It is
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statute providing for forfeiture of a life estate in the case of waste63 or
failure to pay taxes" might have the same effect."5 Destruction of the life
estate by merger66 or disseizen followed by adverse possession for the statu-
tory period 7 destroyed the contingent remainders based upon the particular
life estate.
Most states, either by statute or by judicial decision have abolished the
doctrine of destructibility of contingent remainders.6 England has passed
a statute making contingent remainders indestructible.6 9
Section 10512-6 of the Ohio General Code prevents the destruction of
contingent remainders by a tortious conveyance effected by the holder of
the precedent estate, or "... . by a destruction of such precedent estate by
disseizen, forfeiture,7" surrender, merger or otherwise..." In the case of
an alternate contingent remainder in C, the remainder would probably be
believed, however, that the destruction of a contingent remainder by a life tenant
attempting to convey a fee is no longer possible, since the rule today is that a life
tenant can convey no greater interest than he has. Howell v. Howell, 122 Ohio St.
543, 172 N.E. 528 (1930); Clark v. Leavitt, 335 Ill. 184, 166 N.E. 538 (1929).
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 124 (1936). 2 TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 59 (3d ed. 1939).
"E.g., OHIO GEN. CODE § 10503-23.
€, E.g., OHIO GEN. CODE § 5688.
"1 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 100 (1936).
"Blackstone wrote: '"Whenever a greater estate and a less coincide and meet in one
and the same person without any intermediate *estate, the less is immediately annihil-
ated; or, in the law phase, it is said to be merged, that is sunk or drowned in the
greater." 2 BL. COMM. *177. The doctrine of merger developed into highly tech-
nical rules. Among these was the rule that the merger would operate even though
a contingent remainder intervened between the two estates concerned, since a con-
tingent remainder was not an estate. A considerable number of decisions have
sustained the destruction of contingent remainders by merger. See cases cited in 3
SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 102, p. 173, N. 27 (1936). RESTATEMENT, PROP-
ERTY § 152 (d) (1936). Statutes making contingent remainders indestructible by
merger have changed this rule. See notes 68, 69, infra.
072 TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 328 (3d ed. 1939). See 1 SIMES, Fu-
TUaB INTERESTS § 101, p. 172 (1936).
"For statutes and decisions which have abolished the destructibility of contingent
remainders rule see 1 SiMES, op. cit. supra, note 74, §§ 111-113. RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 240, special note, pp. 721-722 (1936) (lists state statutes making con-
tingent remainders indestructible to January 1, 1936). See Simes, Fifty Years of
Future Interests, 50 HARv. L REv. 749, at 757 (1937).
o (1845) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, § 8: "... a contingent remainder existing at any
time after the 31st of December, 1844, shall be, and, if created before the passing
of this act, shall be deemed to have been capable of taking effect, notwithstanding
the determination, by forfeiture, surrender, or merger, of any preceding estate of
freehold in the same manner, in all respects, as if such determination had not hap-
pened."
"This eliminates the possibility of destruction of a contingent remainder where the
preceding life estate has been forfeited for failure to pay taxes, OHIo GEN. CODE
§ 5688, or for commission of waste, OHIO GEN. CODE § 10503-23.
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looked upon by the parties as an "emergency" contingency, extremely un-
likely to go into effect, and if so, solely to prevent any possible reversion of
the property. The parties in all probability never intended to limit the
power of A and B to convey a perfect title. Yet, the indestructibility of
C's remainder defeats that very intent. The only way C's remainder may be
destroyed is if the manner of destruction is provided for in the original
instrument. This is permitted by the last portion of Ohio General Code
Section 10512-6:
.... but an expectant estate may be defeated in any manner, or by any act
or means which the party creating such estate, in the creation thereof, has
provided for or authorized ....
Thus A and B may convey a fee simple only if there were a power of sale
expressly reserved to them in the survivorship instrument under which
they held.71 Until the actual conveyance, however, Cs remainder is valid 7 2
If A and B die simultaneously, still possessed of their estates, C receives
the entire property in fee simple.
b. Where the form of the instrument is "... but in the event of simul-
taneous death of A and B, remainder to be distributed among the heirs of
A and B . . ." the distribution is equitable, and in accord with the principles
previously discussed. The transferor has no right to possession, present
or future.7 1 So long as A and B hold the property, all is well. But in Ohio,
at least, an attempted conveyance of a fee simple by A and B would be in-
effectual. In view of the fact that the rule in Shelley's 'case has been
abolished by statute in Ohio,74 and because of the statutory abolition of the
' E.g.: ".... A and B together shall have the power to convey a fee simple absolute
estate, anything to the contrary in this instrument notwithstanding .... inserted
in the instrument of transfer.
"' ".... An expectant estate thus liable to be defeated [by any act provided for by
the party creating the estate] shall not, on that ground, be adjudged void in its
creation." OHIO GEN. CODE § 10512-6.
"See note 60, supra.
T4OHIo GEN. CODE § 10504-70:
When lands, tenements or hereditaments are given by deed or will to
a person for his life, and after his death to his heirs in fee, the conveyance
shall vest an estate for life only in such first taker, and a remainder in fee
simple in his heirs .... The rule in Shelley's case is hereby abolished and
shall not be given force or effect.
Without going into the historical bases for the rule in Shelley's case, or into the
intricacies of the rule, it is sufficient to note here, that the rule would make the
remainder to the heirs words of limitation rather than words of purchase; thereby
limiting and describing the estate in the ancestor (A and B, in our example), rather
than granting any new estate. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 312 (1940). 1 SrnEs,
FUTURE INTERESTS § 114 (1936). Since the rule applies to contingent remainders
as well, RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 312 (2) (1940), no remainder in anyone
other than A and B would be created. Thus the provisions against destructibility of
contingent remainders would be inapplicable, and A and B could together convey a
good tide to a third person.
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destructibility of contingent remainders,75 the alternate contingent re-
mainder to the heirs of A and B remains separate from the life estates and
indestructible. Since A and B have no power of disposal or destruction of
this remainder, their transferee takes subject to the remainder.70 Here too,
if the original transferor wishes to allow A and B to freely alienate the
whole fee, a power to convey a fee simple must be expressly given to them:'
c. If the instrument provides "... . but if there is insufficient evidence to
show whether A or B survived, the property is to revert to the transferor,
O . . .": In this instance, no constructive trust can be imposed in favor of the
heirs of A and B, after title has reverted to the transferor or his heirs. The
intent as expressed governs.
In none of the situations discussed above, is there any restriction on
alienation. A and B are free to transfer the full extent of the interest they
own.77 They may transfer their interests independently, or jointly to a
single transferee. In no case, however, can they transfer a greater interest
than they hold.78 Because of the indestructibility of contingent remainders
today, neither A nor B can destroy the other's remainder by a purported
conveyance of the fee.
5. Transfers ;under instruments not providing for simultaneous death
Even where the instrument under which A and B hold creates no al-
ternative remainders or express reversion in the event of failure of their
cross contingent remainders, A and B can not convey an absolute title be-
cause of the reversionary interest remaining in the original transferor.1 9 This
"Omo GiEN. CODE §§ 10512-5, 10512-6.
T RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 124 (1936).
'This is true whether or not the instrument under which A and B hold provides
for a third contingency in the event of their simultaneous death. A's interest is an
undivided one half life estate, plus a remainder in fee subject to the condition pre-
cedent of his surviving B; B's interest is the same, except that his remainder is sub-
ject to the condition precedent of his surviving A.
The estates for life, being vested estates, are freely alienable. 2 TIFFANY, LAW
OF REAL. PROPERTY § 59 (3d ed. 1939).
At common law, a contingent remainder was not alienable inter vivos, with cer-
tain exceptions. Du Bois v. Judy, 291 II. 340, 126 N.E. 104 (1920). See Rob-
erts, Transfer of Future Interests, 30 McrH. L. REV. 349 (1932). The prevailing
American view, however, is that a contingent remainder is freely alienable. Putnam
v. Story, 132 Mass. 205 (1882). RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 162 (inter vivos),
§ 164 (by intestate succession), § 165 (by testate succession) (1936). See 2 TIF-
FANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 341 (3d ed. 1939).
" Howell v. Howell, 122 Ohio St. 543, 172 N.E. 528 (1930); Clark v. Ieavitt, 335
Ill. 184, 166 N.E. 538 (1929). RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 124 (1936) (trans-
fers by life tenants).
"It is probable that there have been conveyances of what was assumed to be a full
fee simple in such situations. But the event giving rise to the difficult problems -
simultaneous death -has either not occurred, or if so, has not been brought to the
attention of a court.
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reversion, though not express, arises by operation of law.80 If it be said
that A and B take title free of any reversionary interest, the result is arbi-
trarily reached, based solely upon the presumed intent of the parties. It
would seem doubtful that such intent alone would suffice to transfer the
complete fee. The problem will be avoided if an express power of sale in
favor of the holders of the life estates is reserved in the survivorship instru-
ment. No question would then arise as to their ability to create a fee simple
in a third person. It is also possible that some courts will infer such a
power, from the very nature of the instrument.
If such a power were not included, and A and B were to die simul-
taneously after joining in a conveyance to P, it seems clear that P should be
able to force a conveyance out of the reversioner, on the basis of a construc-
tive trust -as the heirs of A and B would be able to do, had A and B not
transferred their interests."' However, if P sought a court order forcing a
conveyance out of the reversioner while A and B were still alive, the prob-
lem might be regarded as moot, and the remedy refused. It would seem,
however, that P should be allowed to quiet his title to the land, even though
simultaneous death of A and B may never occur.
CONCLUSION
The Ohio courts have not yet had to consider the problem of disposing
of land held under survivorship deeds in the event of simultaneous death
of the co-owners. Little precedent exists to serve as a guide. As Ohio
stands today, simultaneous death of the co-owners would probably lead to
an equal distribution of the land to their heirs or assigns. For the property
draftsman, the most satisfactory approach would be to make A and B tenants
in common in fee with executory interests-creating no troublesome re-
version.
If the conveyance creates in the co-owners joint life estates with con-
tingent remainders, the greatest problem is in circumventing the reversion-
ary interest remaining in the transferor. Although a trust in favor of the
heirs of the grantees would most likely be imposed upon the reversioner,
a different result might be reached in the case of a gratuitous conveyance or
a devise. The most satisfactory course is for the parties to provide for a
third contingent remainder to take effect when survivorship of one of the
life tenants cannot be shown. To avoid the embarrassment caused the co-
' See note 60, supra.
' if, however, the original transfer to A and B was gratuitous, it is difficult to see
how P could have a constructive trust imposed in his favor. If A and B are donees,
most courts would not impose a trust upon the property in favor of their heirs. P
has no greater rights than his transferors -A and B. The fact that he parted with
consideration does not alter his legal position.
1
2 OHio GEN. CODE § 10503-18.
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